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Abstract
Deep Neural Network based classifiers are known to be
vulnerable to perturbations of inputs constructed by an ad-
versarial attack to force misclassification. Most studies
have focused on how to make vulnerable noise by gradient
based attack methods or to defense model from adversar-
ial attack. The use of the denoiser model is one of a well-
known solution to reduce the adversarial noise although
classification performance had not significantly improved.
In this study, we aim to analyze the propagation of adversar-
ial attack as an explainable AI(XAI) point of view. Specif-
ically, we examine the trend of adversarial perturbations
through the CNN architectures. To analyze the propagated
perturbation, we measured normalized Euclidean Distance
and cosine distance in each CNN layer between the feature
map of the perturbed image passed through denoiser and
the non-perturbed original image. We used five well-known
CNN based classifiers and three gradient-based adversarial
attacks. From the experimental results, we observed that in
most cases, Euclidean Distance explosively increases in the
final fully connected layer while cosine distance fluctuated
and disappeared at the last layer. This means that the use
of denoiser can decrease the amount of noise. However, it
failed to defense accuracy degradation.
1. Introduction
In the computer vision field, deep neural net-
works(DNNs) achieve successful performance across var-
ious areas such as image classification, object detection,
and semantic segmentation. But even though DNN is
well trained, it can be easily degraded when noise is
added to input data. Especially, DNN models trained by
gradient-descent and back-propagation can be deteriorated
by gradient-based noise attack, so called adversarial noise
[2, 17, 25]. In such an adversarial attack to classifier case,
∗Equal contribution, alphabetical order
†Corresponding author
noise is located near discriminant hyperplane of DNN mod-
els, which makes easy to deceive the classifier. Thus, it is
accomplished by making noise in a vulnerable area of DNN
[28, 14]. Briefly, adversarial noise is a practical method be-
cause it could perturb target DNN without involvement in
the learning process, and it often happens that it is difficult
to visually confirm the presence of noise.
As a defense method for the type of adversarial attack,
it is very natural to consider gradient masking, which hides
the gradient of DNNs. But, gradient-based noise could be
easily generated by substituting a model to a target classi-
fier called a black-box attack [18, 19]. Therefore, most dif-
ferentiable DNN could be easily exposed to gradient-based
attack.
One of basic defense method against adversarial noise
is to remove adversarial perturbation before the classi-
fier. Among many denoising methods, denoising Auto-
Encoder(DAE) [29] can be designed as a convolutional neu-
ral network (CNN) that can reduce the number of parame-
ters and improve calculation efficiency while it maintains
the performance [4]. For example, encoder-decoder struc-
ture and lateral skip-connection for residual learning based
methods such as U-Net [22], FusionNet [20] and stacked U-
Net [24] were introduced. Though the schemes are designed
for image segmentation, it could be trained as a denoiser us-
ing pixel distance based objective function.
As shown the table 1, the experiment addressed that the
performance of classifiers was not significantly improved
in spite of reduced noise by the denoiser(FusionNet). It
means that the characteristics of adversarial noise affect
classification performance. For a good understanding of
this phenomenon, adversarial noise has to be observed, how
it would be propagated while it passes through DNN.
In this study, we examined of propagation behavior from
input to output using well-known classifiers, three gradient-
based attack noise - fast gradient sign method(FGSM) [5],
iterative fast gradient sign method(i-FGSM) [14] and mo-
mentum iterative fast gradient sign method(mi-FGSM) [3].
We analyzed why this kind of noise is difficult to defence
using denoiser and DNN classifier.
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adversarial mode Perturbation of Val. set(pix) Top-1 Val. Acc. (%)
MSE(xvalori , x
val
adv) MSE(x
val
ori , DN(x
val
adv)) F(x
val
adv) F(DN(x
val
adv))
FGSM V1 0.166 0.268 80.24 80.31
FGSM V2 6.018 2.703 27.06 45.47
i-FGSM V1 1.071 0.689 59.37 66.77
i-FGSM V2 3.621 1.415 29.6 45.68
mi-FGSM 1.262 0.574 76.43 78.41
Table 1: Adversarial perturbation measured by mean square error (MSE) and corresponding accuracy on a validation set
of TinyImageNet. Classifier and denoiser are Inception-Resnet V2(train accuracy 86.67%, validation accuracy 82.0%) and
FusionNet respectively. xvalori is the original validation images and x
val
adv is the corresponding adversarial examples. DN(·) is
the output passing through the denoiser and F(·) is the classifier output. It seems that there is no exact dependency between
the amount of noise and validation accuracy.
1.1. Contribution
In this study, we made the following contributions.
• We observed propagation of black-box and white-box
adversarial attack noise from input to output layer for
DNN models, and tried to explain how to generate hy-
perplane. We Also showed that efficacy of standard de-
noiser based on DAE is limited for adversarial defense.
According to the observation, we found that although
perturbation is reduced, propagation is amplified to a
similar level. We also analyzed the difference between
original and adversarial samples and provided under-
standing about defense against adversarial attack.
• We experimented using various CNNs which have dif-
ferent capacity. From the experiment, we provided in-
sight about propagation behavior respect to capacity
and architecture.
2. Preparations
For observing the propagation of adversarial perturba-
tion through a classifier, we calculated some distance be-
tween feature maps of original data and perturbed one layer
by layer. Before running into it, three essential components,
1)generation of adversarial examples, 2)trained classifiers
by training the dataset, and 3)trained denoisers by perturbed
datasets, are required.
2.1. Generation of adversarial examples
On generation adversarial examples, we used three types
of gradient-based attack and generated five adversarial
datasets. datasets are generated by using TinyImageNet [1]
and black&white-box attack [18, 19] in this paper.
• Fast gradient sign method(FGSM) [5]: To generate
adversarial example, the attacker accumulates pertur-
bation to the direction of input-output gradient to the
original image, as follows:
xadv ←− x+  · sign(∇xJ(θ, x, y)) (1)
In the equation x is an original input image, y is the
ground truth label,  is the step size of the perturbation,
sign() is the sign function, J(θ, x, y) is the loss func-
tion when θ is the trained attacker’s parameters, and
∇x is the gradient function for x. The attacker contin-
ues to accumulate it until it successes to mis-classify
for the classifier or gets to ’s step limitation.
• Iterative fast gradient sign method(i-FGSM) [14]:
Similar to FGSM, this attack iteratively computes the
direction of the gradient and accumulates it to the im-
age perturbed just before, as follows:
xk+1 ←− xk +  · sign(∇xJ(θ, xk, y)) (2)
Attack would be stopped when it can lead misclassifi-
cation for the classifier or gets to ’s step limit.
• Momentum iterative fast gradient sign method(mi-
FGSM) [3]: In this method, a gradient is updated from
the previous version with the momentum term, then it
is accumulated to the image perturbed just before, as
follows:
g0 = 0, x0 = original image
gk+1 ←− µ · gk + ∇xJ(θ, xk, y)||∇xJ(θ, xk, y)||1
xk+1 ←− xk +  · sign(gk+1)
(3)
In the equation, xk is k times perturbed noise and µ is
balancing coefficient to adjust the change of the gradi-
ent by using a previous one. It also iterates this proce-
dure until the classifier misclassifies the input or it gets
to ’s step limit.
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Figure 1: Concept of the experiment. We measure differences between feature maps of different inputs at the specified
layer in the identical classifier. In the baseline setting, we feed original images to a classifier. Then, we also feed five types
of adversaries and denoised adversaries to classifier for comparing the difference. Measuring difference is conducted by
normalized Euclidean and cosine distance (NE-D & COS-D) between two feature maps, vlori and v
l
adv which are the feature
maps for the original and adversarial inputs at the l th layer. n is the number of elements in the feature map.
In general, the attacker is a substitute model of the clas-
sifier. In the black box attack, attack for input is iteratively
conducted until a classifier returns a wrong label. During
the attack, as an input-output gradient, adversarial pertur-
bation is calculated in the attacker, which is another classi-
fier trained on the same task. Based on these methods, we
generated five adversarial examples sets by using Foolbox
library [21] which is a python toolbox of large collection
about the adversarial attack. The configurations for gener-
ating adversarial examples are shown in Table 2.
attacker
(top-1 val. acc.)
classifier
(top-1 val. acc.)
FGSM v1
ResNet-18
(60%) [7]
ResNet-18 (60%)
FGSM v2 Inception-ResNet V2 (80%)
i-FGSM v1 ResNet-18 (60%)
i-FGSM v2 Inception-ResNet V2 (80%)
mi-FGSM Inception-ResNet V2 (80%)
Table 2: Configurations for generating adversarial datasets.
2.2. Preparation of classifiers trained by training
set
To observe the propagation of adversarial perturbation,
5 well-known CNNs with different capacity, i.e. VGG-
19 [26], ResNet V2-50 [9], Inception-ResNet V2 [27],
DenseNet-201 [11] and SENet-154 [10], were trained with
TinyImageNet training set. For generalization, we trained
them nearly perfectly on the training set. Before training,
parameters of all classifiers were initialized by pre-trained
model on ImageNet [23] and input images were resized
to 128×128 (original size is 64×64) by bilinear interpo-
lation. As an aside, we slightly modified their architecture
(by adjustment stride size in the low level layers), as pre-
trained models were optimized to the image size (299×299)
of ImageNet. Training examples were sequentially trans-
formed with random crop (range 0.85∼1.0) and horizontal
flip (prob. 0.5) for each epoch, and normalized by a range of
(-1.0, 1.0). Each of them was trained with Adam optimizer
[12] with an initial learning rate of 1.0e−5 and L2 regular-
ization coefficient of 1.0e−5. The prepared classifiers and
their capacity are shown in Table 3.
2.3. Preparation of denoiser trained by adversarial
example sets
As a denoising architecture, the authors selected U-Net
[22] and FusionNet [20] as a denoiser. The reason is that U-
Net methodology has proven to perform well in maintaining
the robustness of models against adversarial attacks (in the
NIPS2017 adversarial vision challenge [13]). So we have
experimented with U-Net. Moreover, FusionNet which is
an improved version of U-Net by skip-connections was used
[20]. They were trained by a mean square error (MSE) ob-
jective between original images and adversarial examples.
During training, each input batch consisted of all kinds of
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top-1
training
acc.(%)
Num.
layers
Num.
parameters
ResNet V2-50 99.905 50 25.56M
VGG-19 99.221 19 138.36M
SENet-154 99.334 154 113.45M
Inception-ResNet V2 99.598 234 55.97M
DenseNet-201 99.907 201 18.47M
Table 3: well-known classifiers and their capacity. We used
them to observe the propagation of adversarial perturba-
tion. For generalization, all classifiers were nearly perfectly
trained to the TinyImageNet training dataset.
adversaries with ratio of FGSM v1 : FGSM v2 : i-FGSM v1
: i-FGSM v2 : mi-FGSM = 0.05 : 0.30 : 0.05 : 0.30 : 0.30.
FGSM and i-FGSM v1 are slightly perturbed dataset while
FGSM and i-FGSM v2 are more heavily perturbed dataset.
To compute MSE, we set the denoisers to generate the same
output size (64×64) to the adversarial input. The Fusion-
Net was trained for 300 epochs with Adam optimizer with
an initial learning rate of 1.0e−5 and L2 regularization coef-
ficient of 1.0e−5. The U-Net was trained using fine-tuning
with Adam optimizer with an initial learning rate of 1.0e−7
and L2 regularization coefficient of 1.0e−6. Primary and
reduced errors between the training set and corresponding
adversaries measured by MSE for each denoiser are shown
in Table 4.
Primary
MSE(xtrori,
xtradv)
FusionNet
MSE(xtrori,
DNf (xtradv))
U-Net
MSE(xtrori,
DNu(xtradv))
FGSM v1 0.051 0.230 0.168
FGSM v2 13.439 7.395 8.537
i-FGSM v1 1.224 0.829 0.738
i-FGSM v2 4.220 1.632 1.538
mi-FGSM 1.466 0.612 0.572
Table 4: Primary and reduced errors between the training
set and corresponding adversaries measured by MSE. xtrori
and xtradv mean original images and adversarial examples
for the training set. DNf (·) and DNu(·) are outputs from
trained FusionNet and U-Net denoisers, respectively. Unit
is pixels.
3. Experiments
We assume that the prepared classifiers are nearly gener-
alized to the training set with their training accuracy. So, ob-
serving the propagation of perturbations for its correspond-
ing adversarial sets is justified, since they can purely con-
tribute to making the classifiers fool. In the remaining part
of the paper, please note that we only use a training set and
its corresponding adversarial sets.
As seen in Figure 1, to observe the propagation of adver-
sarial perturbation, we should measure the difference be-
tween the feature maps extracted from the identical classi-
fier, layer by layer. We can consider two feature maps; one
is extracted by the original input (Baseline), and the other
by the adversarial input (Configuration 1). The difference
is measured by Euclidean and cosine distance (COS-D) be-
tween two feature vectors at the same layer, respectively.
Euclidean value is normalized by the number of elements
of the feature map, so we call it normalized Euclidean dis-
tance (NE-D). Additionally, as the classifiers show limited
improvement even though passing through the denoising
process (Table 5), we also need to observe the feature maps
by denoised adversaries passed by denoiser (Configuration
2).
Practically, it is time-consuming to observe all of fea-
ture maps to all the datasets, due to tremendously large size
of them and computational cost. Thus, we appointed some
representative feature maps to observe for each CNN and
Table 6 shows them. Because recently proposed DNNs have
too much feature maps to observe all of them. So we only
evaluated the last layers of each block as a representative
layer. It is a common approach to analyze feature maps,
such as [15]. Additionally, as extracting feature maps for all
of the image set was burdensome work in the aspect of com-
putational time and resources, we randomly sampled 1,000
images from the original training set and took adversarial
examples corresponding to them. Consequently, at one ob-
served position in one CNN, we measured the average dis-
tance of 1,000 feature map pairs of the originals (Baseline)
and adversaries (Configuration 1) or denoised adversaries
(Configuration 2).
In this experiment, PyTorch 0.4.1 and Python 3.5.2 were
used in the Ubuntu 16.04 LTS.
4. Results and Discussion
Figure 2 and 3 show experimental results about averaged
NE-D and COS-D between the feature maps of baseline and
configuration settings for each classifier and adversarial set.
In all classifier with/without denoiser, NE-D explosively in-
creases in the fully connected (FC) layer while it tends to
keep in small in the convolutional layers (i.e. all layers
except for the last one). Generally, adversarial set which
has relatively larger perturbation (FGSM v2 and i-FGSM
v2) shows a bigger gap than others. Especially, VGG-19
shows an incredibly large jump in the gap after the last
FC layer. On the other hand, Figure 3 shows dramatic di-
rectional identification at the end of each network by the
FC layers, while the directional gap is gradually increased
(ResNet V2-50, VGG-19, and SENet-154) or shows up-
down-up (Inception-ResNet V2 and DenseNet-201) in the
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ResNet V2-50 VGG-19 SENet-154
Inception-
ResNet V2 DenseNet-201
w/o
DN w/ FN w/ UN
w/o
DN w/ FN w/ UN
w/o
DN w/ FN w/ UN
w/o
DN w/ FN w/ UN
w/o
DN w/ FN w/ UN
FGSM v1 98.9 98.6 99.3 95.7 96.3 96.0 97.3 96.3 96.8 91.2 97.3 98.4 98.1 98.4 97.1
FGSM v2 33.8 64.5 69.2 27.7 48.9 52.0 35.1 52.5 56.6 34.2 57.0 61.3 32.0 60.7 60.2
i-FGSM v1 77.7 87.3 88.2 52.2 64.7 67.9 68.7 74.6 76.8 71.5 78.4 79.8 69.2 82.3 82.5
i-FGSM v2 41.1 69.2 71.1 32.2 48.2 48.8 39.4 54.7 55.6 39.1 59.2 60.8 38.9 62.2 63.7
mi-FGSM 94.1 96.9 97.0 93.1 96.3 96.1 94.6 95.8 96.3 94.6 96.8 96.8 94.3 97.4 96.8
Table 5: Classification accuracy on the adversarial sets of each classifier with/without the denoiser. The classifiers are general-
ized to the training set. All classifiers show somewhat reasonable performance to the adversarial sets with small perturbation
(FGSM v1, i-FGSM v1, and mi-FGSM). However, they show relatively lower performance to the bigger adversarial sets
(FGSM v2, i-FGSM v2) even though inputs pass through the denoising process. FN: FusionNet, UN: U-Net
Figure 2: Average normalized Euclidean distance (NE-D) between the feature maps by baseline and configuration settings
according to the adversaries and the classifiers. Each figure means the distance at the last observed feature map (i.e. the last
layer).
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Figure 3: Average COS-D between the feature maps output by baseline and configuration settings according to the adversaries
and the classifiers. Each figure is the distance at the last observed feature map (i.e. the last layer).
convolutional layers. Figure 3’s result is consistent with
[16], which confirmed that a feature vector of the middle
layer shows the behavior of outlier.
In the aspect of the effect of denoisers, MSE was not
perfectly eliminated by the denoisers (see Table 4), so that
they gave not enough improvement in validation accuracy in
spite of reduced adversarial noise (see Table 5). As seen the
graph in Figure 2 and 3, NE-D is a little, but not enough,
decreased compared to the case without the denoisers (Of
course, in ResNet-V2 50, noise is reduced 20∼ 30 % in the
case of FGSM v2 and i-FGSM v2). COS-D also tends to
be reduced during the convolutional layers, but it becomes
identical eventually. Based on that observation, denoisers
are somewhat effective in reducing COS-D in the middle
layers. We should note that NE-D is much a little reduced
at the last layers in SENet-154, Inception-ResNet V2 and
DenseNet-201. This phenomenon seems that it relates to
weaker improvement than the case of ResNet V2-50.
Overall, observations for the experiment follow below,
1. In convolutional layers, adversarial perturbation is not
amplified with averaged NE-D, but with COS-D. How-
ever, in FC layers, it shows the opposite pattern. As
an exceptional case, in ResNet V2-50, COS-D is not
decreased when passing through the FC layer while it
shows relatively lower NE-D than others.
2. As seen in Table 5, accuracy is most improved when a
denoiser is combined with ResNet V2-50. Seemingly,
ResNet V2-50 has successful noise suppression capac-
ity than other classifiers when seen NE-D. However, it
poorly controls the direction of noise in the aspect of
COS-D.
3. Effect of denoiser is different depends on classifiers,
but it is limited from the aspect of a logit vector. NE-
D shows that the amount of change of ResNet V2-
50 is larger than other classifiers, such as SENet-154,
Inception-ResNet V2 and DenseNet-201. Denoiser
also reduce COS-D in middle layers for all classifiers.
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(a)Radial discriminant hyperplane
(b)Tangential discriminant hyperplane
Figure 4: Two types of discriminant hyperplane. Based on
the observations, ResNet V2-50’s plane is anticipated as ra-
dial and the others’ as tangental.
Resnet V2-50 VGG-19 SENet-154 Inception-ResNet V2
DenseNet
-201
1 1 convs 2 convs 3 convs 1 conv
1 Conv,
1 max pool,
6 FCs
2 1 max pool 2 convs 3 SE block 1 conv 1 transition
3 3 bottlenecks 4 convs 8 SE block 1 conv 12 FCs
4 4 bottlenecks 4 convs 36 SE block 1 conv 1 transition
5 6 bottlenecks 4 convs 3 SE block 1 conv 48 FCs
6 3 bottlenecks 1 FC 1 avg pool 1 maxpool,1 mixed_b 1 transition
7 1 avg pool 1 FC 1 FC 10 Block35s 32 FCs
8 1 FC layer 1 FC mixed_a 1 max pool,1 FC
9 20 Block17s
10 mixed_a
11 9 Block8s
12 1 Block8
13 1 conv,1 avg pool
14 1 FC
Table 6: Selected feature map lists of each classifier. Fea-
ture maps are extracted right after each procedure, which is
written in the table.
When seen the results of the last FC layer, adversaries re-
sult in angular (ResNet V2-50) or longitudinal perturbations
(the others). This means that the different discriminant hy-
perplane might be constructed according to the classifiers.
Since the adversarial examples are generated to make the
classifiers fool, it is reasonable for us to infer where the
discriminant hyperplane is, based on moved feature vec-
tors. When inferring from relative small NE-D and large
COS-D, a radial discriminant plane might be reasonable
in the case of ResNet V2-50, as seen in Figure 4(a). On
the other hand, in the case of the other classifiers, a tan-
gential one is strongly suspected, as seen in Figure 4(b).
With this inference, it is convincible that effectiveness of
DenseNet-201
FC->Conv. adding PRelu after FC
w/o DN w/ FN w/ UN w/o DN w/ FN w/ UN
FGSM V1 97.4 96.3 96.9 97.8 97.6 97.8
FGSM V2 31.6 56.7 56.6 30.7 59.9 59.6
i-FGSM V1 63.7 74.6 73.8 66.3 78.2 78.7
i-FGSM V2 37.1 58.2 56.4 38.3 61.6 59.9
mi-FGSM 93.9 96.0 96.8 94 95.5 96.7
Table 7: Accuracy of two types of modified DenseNet-201s.
the denoisers is maximized in ResNet V2-50, since reduced
COS-D (approx. 50% or more) and small NE-D are very
effective to prevent misclassification. On the contrary, in
the other cases which have a tangential plane, in spite of
tiny COS-D, an improvement on performance cannot eas-
ily be achieved unless the denoiser reduces NE-D much a
lot. Thus, ResNet V2-50 architecture is more efficient than
other architectures to reduce NE-D in the experiment. How-
ever, because the adversarial perturbed image set is gener-
ated by ResNet only, additional experiments using various
attacker have to be conducted for consistency.
Due to surprisingly amplified NE-D in the last FC layer,
it is natural to consider replacement of it to convolutional
one. Because DNN is generally trained to be overconfident
[6], it is guessable that final FC layer is trained to make
it’s distance large. So, we additionally conducted the same
experiment with modified DenseNet-201(i.e. the last layer
is modified from avg. pooling(kernel size=4, stride=1, no
padding) + FC to Conv. layer (kernel size=4, stride=1, no
padding), so the network has only Conv. layers). But, there
is no big difference (but, tiny improvement) when compar-
ing to the previous result (See Figure 5). It is somewhat
guessable because it just changes a linear operation from on
1×1 map to on 4×4 that is similar setting in that it refers to
whole map, not local. Consequently, the FC layer itself, at
least, is not a direct factor of amplification of NE-D.
In fact, except for the last FC layer, all feature maps
were observed after Relu activation which reduces NE-
D via rectifying the output. At that point, we wondered
whether getting lower NE-D is possible or not if Relu is
added after the FC. With that setting, we experimented
again with DenseNet-201. However, generalization could
not be achieved with the training set. So, we changed Relu
to PRelu(α = 0.25) [8] instead.
As a result, NE-D of the model is decreased while COS-
D is increased on the opposite side (Figure 6). The plot of
NE-D and COS-D for the model follows a similar pattern to
that of ResNet V2-50, but it little affects the performance
(Table 7). Consequently, a classifier which is trained to
reduce NE-D causes large COS-D logit, and training only
using NE-D could not affect the performance. Thus, the
performance of denoiser for the model is less than that of
ResNet V2-50.
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Figure 5: Average NE-D and COS-D in the case of DenseNet-201 which replaced FC to Conv layer.
Figure 6: Average NE-D and COS-D in the case of DenseNet-201 adding PRelu after the FC layer.
5. Conclusion
To defense adversarial attack, the use of denoiser is the
most widely used solution. It reduces the amount of noise,
but the improvement of classification accuracy is marginal.
In this paper, we aimed to examine the propagation of
adversarial perturbation by measuring Euclidean distance
and cosine distance in each CNN layer between each fea-
ture map of the original image and perturbed image passed
through denoiser. We observed that Euclidean distance ex-
plosively increases in final FC layer while cosine distance
fluctuated and disappeared at the last layer in most cases
except the ResNet V2-50 classifier. In the case of ResNet
V2-50, COS-D explosively increased in final FC layer while
NE-D disappeared at the last layer. The accuracy improve-
ment of ResNet V2-50 is more than that of other networks.
This means that the two types of distance could be utilized
to examine how noise is propagated through the network. It
would be interesting future work to analysis why the ResNet
V2-50 is robust for an adversarial attack.
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